中國(guó)“一帶一路”政策對(duì)周圍鄰國(guó)有何影響?
2015-12-01 16:32:03
Landbridge平臺(tái)
來源:福布斯
作者:本·辛芬德費(fèi)爾 | 香港絲綢之路戰(zhàn)略咨詢公司創(chuàng)始人
譯/徐笑音 校/陳岳林
中國(guó)“一帶一路”政策對(duì)周圍鄰國(guó)有何影響?
關(guān)于中國(guó)的“一帶一路”政策已經(jīng)有了大量報(bào)道,該政策本身其實(shí)是引導(dǎo)中國(guó)與近鄰開展商業(yè)合作、發(fā)展政治互信的一個(gè)使命宣言。這是眼下發(fā)生的真正重要的事。
而該政策的影響差異明顯。過去12個(gè)月里,我去過哈薩克斯坦、巴基斯坦和阿聯(lián)酋的一些城市,也到過亞洲其他國(guó)家,與當(dāng)?shù)貙?shí)業(yè)家和中國(guó)企業(yè)主聊過該政策對(duì)商業(yè)活動(dòng)有何影響。各人的說法不一,很明顯該政策的影響將因國(guó)家不同而存在巨大差異。
哈薩克斯坦的情況展現(xiàn)了該政策的復(fù)雜性。作為中國(guó)的一個(gè)近鄰,以及所謂絲綢之路經(jīng)濟(jì)帶的一部分,哈薩克斯坦應(yīng)該是第一批感受到該政策影響的國(guó)家之一。我的當(dāng)?shù)亟哟且粋€(gè)中國(guó)人,他很肯定地說,過去6個(gè)月期間,他已經(jīng)接待了約30個(gè)來自中國(guó)的省級(jí)或市級(jí)代表團(tuán)。
然而,近來在哈薩克斯坦呆過一周之后,我對(duì)該政策迄今為止所產(chǎn)生的效果感到失望,即便它可能具有重大的長(zhǎng)期影響。
不要期待中國(guó)商人會(huì)涌上絲綢之路
很多人認(rèn)為,受該政策影響,中國(guó)商人將涌入絲綢之路經(jīng)過的各個(gè)市場(chǎng),我當(dāng)然也去過一些處于該經(jīng)濟(jì)帶上的大型中國(guó)社區(qū)。就拿迪拜來說,據(jù)可靠估計(jì),那里的中國(guó)人口竟有12萬之多。
但在哈薩克斯坦可不是這樣。我花了幾天時(shí)間,參觀了阿拉木圖的幾個(gè)商業(yè)市場(chǎng),只發(fā)現(xiàn)了幾個(gè)中國(guó)商人——據(jù)他們說這是因?yàn)楹茈y弄到工作簽證。事實(shí)上,很多人持的是學(xué)生簽證,但花在市場(chǎng)里的時(shí)間比花在教室里的還要多。
這非常重要,因?yàn)橥伙@出這不是一個(gè)“有部署的”發(fā)展。如果“一帶一路”產(chǎn)生真正的商業(yè)影響,中國(guó)公司將發(fā)現(xiàn)自己更常與當(dāng)?shù)睾献鞣焦彩拢亲詭暾墓?yīng)鏈和勞動(dòng)力。
不是每一個(gè)人都對(duì)“一帶一路”感到歡欣鼓舞
對(duì)于東亞人來說,很容易關(guān)注中國(guó)的形勢(shì)變化,不僅如此,他們還想當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為世界其他地方的人也是一樣,尤其在看待“一帶一路”這樣的重大政策時(shí)。實(shí)際情況是,世界很多地方對(duì)中國(guó)的這項(xiàng)新戰(zhàn)略從未有所耳聞。
這里又要舉哈薩克斯坦的例子。該國(guó)政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層非常在意與中國(guó)的商業(yè)合作。然而,就我的體會(huì)來看,很難找到既意識(shí)到該政策又明白其對(duì)自己國(guó)家潛在意義的企業(yè)高管。
這不是批評(píng),只是反映了一個(gè)事實(shí):總的來說,商界對(duì)俄羅斯和歐洲做出的決策更加敏感。也許,隨著低油價(jià)迫使哈薩克斯坦尋找新的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)來源,這種狀況將有所改變。但就目前來說,“一帶一路”不是他們首要關(guān)注的東西。
但該政策仍將有利于哈薩克斯坦
什么能夠改變哈薩克斯坦對(duì)“一帶一路”的認(rèn)識(shí)?中國(guó)在該國(guó)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施方面的潛在投資。我所對(duì)話的高管們通常認(rèn)為對(duì)該國(guó)各大城市以外的二級(jí)路網(wǎng)進(jìn)行投資十分重要,更不用說鐵路方面的投資了。
這對(duì)中國(guó)發(fā)起的亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行(簡(jiǎn)稱亞投行)來說可是一大良機(jī),該銀行正在該地區(qū)尋找可投資的項(xiàng)目。對(duì)于那些擅長(zhǎng)在國(guó)內(nèi)以及全球各新興市場(chǎng)修建公路的中國(guó)公司來說,這同樣是一個(gè)絕佳的機(jī)會(huì)。
然而,要提醒的是:哈薩克斯坦只有1,700萬人口,與一個(gè)中國(guó)大城市的規(guī)模相當(dāng)。機(jī)會(huì)有限,不夠30個(gè)省級(jí)或市級(jí)代表團(tuán)個(gè)個(gè)都吃飽。有些人將失望地空手而歸。
Source: Forbes
Contributor: Ben Simpfendorfer | the founder of Silk Road Associates, a strategic consultancy based in Hong Kong
How China's Silk Road Policy Is Shaping Up In Neighboring Countries
A lot has been written about China’s One Belt One Road policy, but the policy itself is little more than a mission statement to guide the country’s commercial and political engagement with its near neighbors. It’s what happens on the ground that really matters.
It’s also where the differences become apparent. Over the past 12 months, I have visited cities in Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and the UAE, as well as other countries across Asia, speaking with local industrialists and Chinese business owners about how the policy is impacting commercial activity. The stories are mixed and it is clear that the policy’s effects will differ widely by country.
The situation in Kazakhstan demonstrates the policy’s complexities. As a near neighbor of China, and part of the so-called ‘Belt’, the country should be among the first to feel the policy’s impact. My local Chinese fixer certainly claimed he had received some 30 municipal- and provincial-level Chinese delegations to the country during the past six months.
Yet, after recently spending a week in Kazakhstan, I was left feeling underwhelmed by the policy’s impact thus far, even if the long-term changes may yet be significant.
Don’t expect Chinese workers to flood the Silk Road
It’s popular to assume that Chinese traders will flood the Silk Road’s markets as a result of the policy, and I’ve certainly visited some large Chinese communities around the region. Just consider Dubai where the Chinese population is reliably estimated at a huge 120,000.
But this isn’t the case in Kazakhstan. I spent days touring Almaty’s commercial markets and struggled to find more than a handful of Chinese traders–because of their claimed difficulty getting work visas. Many are in fact on student visas but spend more time in the market than the classroom.
That’s important as it underscores that this won’t just be a ‘boots on the ground’ development. If One Belt One Road is to have real commercial implications, Chinese firms will find themselves more often working with local partners rather than bringing their entire supply-chain and workforce with them.
Not everyone is excited about One Belt One Road
For those of us in East Asia, it’s easy to be obsessed by what happens in China. It’s also easy to assume that the rest of the world is, too, especially when looking at a policy change as big as One Belt One Road. The reality is that there are large parts of the world that have never even heard of China’s new strategy.
Kazakhstan is again a case in point. Its political leadership care very much about China’s commercial engagement. Still, in my experience, it is hard to find business executives there who are either aware of the policy or understand its potential implications for the country.
That’s not criticism. It’s simply a reflection of the fact that the business sector is more sensitive to decisions taken in Russia and in Europe, in general. Maybe that will change as low oil prices force the country to look for new sources of economic growth. But for now, OBOR is low priority.
But the policy will still be good for Kazakhstan
What could change perceptions around OBOR? China’s potential investment in the country’s infrastructure. The executives I spoke to most often argued that investment in the country’s secondary road network outside the major cities is critical, not to mention investment in railways.
That’s a perfect opportunity for the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as it scours the region for projects to fund. It is also an ideal opportunity for those Chinese companies that have excelled in building roads at home and in emerging markets around the world.
There is a caveat, however. Kazakhstan has a population of just 17 million people, making it the same size as a single large Chinese city. There simply aren’t enough opportunities for each of those 30 municipal- and provincial-level delegations. Some will leave the country disappointed.
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